We study liquidity on the London Stock Exchange. We find that the average bid-ask spread declines, but that the skewness of the spread increases. These results are robust to firm size, trading volume and price level. Our findings hold when the bid-ask spread is estimated utilising high frequency data. We find that the bid-ask spread prior to earnings announcements dates is significantly higher than that of post earnings announcements, suggesting that asymmetric information has driven the increase in liquidity skewness. We also find that the effect of earnings announcements is more pronounced in the 2007 global financial crisis, consistent with the notion that extreme market downturns amplify asymmetric information. Our overall evidence also implies that increased competition and transparent trading environments limit market makers' abilities to cross-subsidize bid-ask spreads between periods of high and low levels of asymmetric information.
Introduction
Liquidity is a central feature of securities and financial markets. Liquid financial markets allow market participants to trade large amounts of securities without price impact and at a low cost. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud (2002) find that liquidity affects the expected return of assets. Practically, liquidity plays an important role in high frequency trading, which expanded vastly in the last decade (O'Hara, 2014) . As high frequency trading is more sensitive to transaction costs, traders tend to demand more liquid assets (Bowen, Hutchinson, and O'Sullivan, 2010) . Also, central banks, financial regulators and policy makers are concerned with market liquidity and its dynamics over time given its importance in the promotion of financial stability (Pelizzon et al. 2016 ).
In recent decades stock market liquidity has significantly increased. The improvement is largely due to the adoption of new computing and communication technologies. However, it is also due arguably to increased competition between multilateral trading facilities and exchanges, transparent pre-trade and post-trade information, the reduction in minimum tick size, and the clamp down on market abuse and insider trading.
Liquidity can be measured by the cost of immediate execution: the bid-ask spread. Traders can submit limit orders awaiting execution or pay the bid-ask spread premium to execute market orders immediately. The quoted ask price reflects a premium required for immediate buying and the bid price contains a concession for immediate selling. Hence, the skewness of bid-ask spreads and its variation over time helps us gain insights into the pattern of trading costs. Using the bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity, the aim of this paper is to investigate the distribution and dynamics of liquidity.
Early work on the dynamics of liquidity suggests that changes in liquidity skewness can be attributed to increased competition between market markers. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that the specialist with monopoly power can set the bidask spread more flexibly than those faced with a more competitive environment.
Consistent with Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) further contend that the skewness of bid-ask spreads is driven by competition among market makers who are less able to cross-subsidize bid-ask spreads during periods of high and low levels of asymmetric information. In periods of low level of asymmetric information market makers with monopoly power are more able to raise spreads and to cover increased losses to informed agents than during periods of high level of asymmetric information. The decline in cross subsidisation in a competitive market contrasts with that of a 'monopolistic' regime in which market makers can flexibly set bid-ask spreads. Increased market competitiveness should force market makers to break even on each transaction across periods of high and low levels of asymmetric information. Consistent with this notion, Bessembinder (2003) show that increased competition and low tick size lead to a clustering of small spreads. However, the bid-ask spread can be positively skewed when the market is illiquid and information asymmetry is high (Pelizzon et al. 2016 ). Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) find that bid-ask spreads in the U.S. equity market have declined, with the spreads also becoming increasingly right-skewed during the period of 1993 -2007 . Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010 attribute liquidity skewness to asymmetric information. Their findings show that liquidity skewness is positively correlated with asymmetric information between firms and investors proxied by institutional holdings and analyst following.
This paper investigates liquidity skewness in the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
The LSE is the third largest stock market in the world and its institutional setting is different from the U.S. markets. Our study is the first out-of-sample test of the findings of Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) . Our dataset includes both daily bidask spreads and high frequency spreads in the LSE from September 1997 to March 2009. Our paper is distinguished from previous studies in two aspects. First, our sample period covers the two biggest market declines in recent times, namely the collapse of the dot-com bubble (2000) (2001) (2002) and the start of the global financial crisis (2007) (2008) . Prior studies show that extreme market downturns significantly reduce liquidity in assets such as government bonds and stocks (Pelizzon et al. 2016; Hameed et al. 2010; Brummermeier and Pedersen, 2009 ). These studies would suggest that liquidity should exhibit different patterns over our sample period. Also, extreme market downturns affect investors' funding capital and, therefore, are likely to widen bid-ask spreads compared to normal times (Brummermeier and Pedersen, 2009 ). This notion implies that the bid-ask spread is likely to be right-skewed in periods of crisis. Second, the LSE is subject to EU legislation. Specifically, the LSE adopted the Market in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID) in November 2007.
MiFID has significantly changed European equity markets, it has increased market competition and transparency. Market makers are required to disclose bid and ask prices, volume and the depth of trading to the general public before and after each transaction in a timely manner. Our sample period covers the adoption of MiFID and consequently allows us to consider the initial impact of MiFID on the LSE.
Our results show that average bid-ask spreads in the LSE decrease significantly throughout our sample period, suggesting a substantial decline in trading costs in the LSE. The bid-ask spread reaches its lowest level between 2008 and 2009, consistent with the anticipated impact of MiFID. However, the skewness of bidask spreads has increased over our sample period. This evidence is consistent with the notion that increased competition and enhanced trading environments limit the power of market makers to flexibly set bid-ask spreads over time. Our findings further show that the skewness of bid-ask spreads peaks when the dot-com bubble burst (2000) (2001) (2002) , and at the outset of the global financial crisis (2007) (2008) . The results imply that extreme market downturns have a significantly negative effect on market liquidity, consistent with the recent findings of Pelizzon et al. (2016) . We also show that the bid-ask spread prior to earnings announcements is significantly higher than the spread in the post earning announcements period. Our evidence that the bid-ask spread is high in extreme market downturns and prior to earnings announcements is consistent with the asymmetric information based explanation for the skewness of liquidity. Our main findings are robust to firm size, trading volume and price level. Finally, our cross-sectional analysis confirms a positive relationship between earnings announcements and the skewness of bid-ask spreads in the 2007 global financial crisis. This result implies that extreme market downturns amplify asymmetric information on the LSE.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional background of the London Stock Exchange and the data set we used in this study.
Section 3 provides the results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The London Stock Exchange and the Data

The London Stock Exchange
The London Stock Exchange is one of the oldest stock exchanges in the world and has its history back to 1698. Today, the LSE is the third largest stock trading venue in the world with a combined market capitalization of over £1.1 trillion on its Main We also examine bid-ask spreads using high frequency data from the LSE for the period 1997 to 2009. The high frequency data consists of the 'tick and best price' data and the 'historical order book rebuild' data. We use the following criteria to eliminate high frequency noise from individual stocks: (1) the stock price must not be lower than 10p and not higher than £999.99; (2) each stock must last 48 months over our data period (September 1996 to March 2009) with valid quotations within market opening hours; (3) the price of a stock in the LSE database must have a corresponding price record on Datastream. After the implementation of the above rules, the data set extended to 1,600 stocks and more than 528 million trades.
For selected stocks, we exclude trades or quotes that are booked during opening and closing auction periods, and that are out of sequence. To determine the direction of trades, the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is applied to match the trading data with the best preceding quote within 5 seconds. In the Lee and Ready algorithm, a buy order is classified when its transaction price is above the midquote; while a sell order is when the transaction price is below the midquote. The 'tick test' is applied to those trades where the transaction price falls at the midpoint between the bid and ask quote. A trade is classified as a buy order if the strike price is higher than the previous trade price. While a trade is classified as a sell order if the price is lower than the previous transaction price. Anomalous trades are also omitted. We consider the following trades to be anomalies: (1) trades with negative bid-ask spreads; (2) proportional quoted spreads >20%; (3) quoted spreads >£5.00.
Following the procedure in Hameed et al. (2010), we calculate the proportional quoted spread (QSPR) by dividing the difference between ask and bid quotes by their midquote. Daily QSPRs are then aggregated by averaging spreads for each day.
Finally, our earnings announcement data is obtained from Thomson One Banker. The skewness for proportional quoted spreads is calculated for all stocks listed in the LSE. The skewness is calculated for each stock for each year ended on 31st August from the corresponding daily data in Datastream, with the annual skewness calculated as the equallyweighted average skewness over all stocks.
Empirical Results
Summary Statistics
Liquidity Skewness by Market Capitalisation, Volume, and Price
Small-cap companies are usually characterized by small market capitalization, low trading volume and low prices. They are additionally more prone to liquidity risk, therefore, they have wider bid-ask spreads. To better understand the dynamics of the skewness of spreads, we examine the skewness of the proportional quoted spread across market capitalisation, trading volume, and price level. We rank firms by their market capitalisation, trading volume, and price level respectively; then for each we calculate the skewness of proportional quoted spreads. This information is presented by quartile in Table 2 . 
Liquidity Skewness in High-Frequency Database
We now examine the skewness of quoted spreads and proportional quoted spreads using high frequency data from September 1996 to March 2009. To calculate the average skewness on an annual basis, we first average spreads within a day to obtain spreads for each stock. Second, we compute the skewness of daily spread for every stock in each year. Finally, we calculate the average of the skewness for all sample stocks on an annual basis. Table 3 and Figure 2 report and plot the average skewness of quoted and proportional quoted spreads, respectively. Table 3 shows that the skewness of quoted and proportional spreads have both 
Asymmetric Information and Earnings Announcement Effect
In this section and the ensuing analysis we utilise the daily dataset. We also focus on proportional quoted spreads rather than quoted spreads as the former are more economically meaningful and free from the measurement unit.
We test whether extreme spreads are more likely to be observed during periods of high level of asymmetric information. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that in 1999-2004 and 2005-2009 . During the first period the dot-com bubble collapsed (2000) (2001) (2002) , and during the second period the onset of the global financial crisis occurred (2007) (2008) . Unreported analysis finds that the results are similar when the sample is divided 1999 -2003 and 2004-2009 . This also holds for the analysis detailed in Table 5 . Chordia et al. (2001) , Hameed et al. (2001) and Hsieh et al. (2013) find that liquidity declines during a pronounced market downturn. Vayanos (2004) argue that the reduced liquidity can be attributable to market makers holding insufficient collateral. Brummermeier and Pedersen (2009) contend that funding constraints faced by market makers, sudden price drops, and illiquidity in the market can interplay with each other to cause a liquidity spiral. In market downturns, investors face a greater liquidity risk and they cannot sell assets unless they are willing to pay large transaction costs. Thus, shifts in liquidity in extreme market downturns can be Subscript s means that the index of scientific notation is to be multiplied by 10 s , for example, 2.2500 −3 is 0.00225.
Down market effects
responsible for the skewness of bid-ask spreads.
We now analyse the impact of market downturns on the skewness of bid-ask spreads. Specifically, we define trading days within the fifth percentile of returns on the FTSE100 index as extreme market downturns. We calculate differences in spreads between trading days within the fifth percentile and other trading days above the sixth percentile, denoted as ER. We expect that ER will have an upward trend over time. The results are reported in Table 5 .
The results show that the mean ER is between 1.5% and 22.34%. The highest ER appears in 2002 when the dot-com bubble burst. Furthermore, the second highest ER occurs in 2008 at the onset of the global financial crisis. These results are consistent with our prior that extreme market downturns significantly increase bid-ask spreads. However, the change in ER between 1997 and 2009 is highly significant, consistent with bid-ask spreads declining. We also show that ER and the skewness have significantly increased from the first sub-period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) to the second sub-period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) . We further show that the correlation between ER and the skewness of the bid-ask spread is also statistically significant. Collectively, our findings suggest that extreme down markets are likely to increase bid-ask spreads and their skewness.
Cross-Sectional Determinants
So far, we find that asymmetric information can explain the skewness of bid-ask spreads over time. In this section, we undertake a cross-sectional analysis to investigate whether asymmetric information, proxied by firm characteristics, can also explain the skewness. Specifically, we run cross-sectional regressions with the skew- (2004 2009)−(1997 2003) 0.5531 ∆ skewness (2004 2009)−(1997 2003) 4.4210 Cross-sectional correlation ER−skewness 0.0951 (p-value) <0.0001
ness of bid-ask spreads as the dependent variable. The independent variables include IE2 and ER as previously defined, firm size, return volatility as proxies for information asymmetry. Large and less volatile stocks should have less information
opaqueness. In addition, we also include the asynchronicity measure proposed by Hou and Moskowitz (2005) as an explanatory variable. This measure is calculated by one minus R 2 which is estimated from a regression of stock returns on the FTSE 100 index and the return on the industry portfolio that the stock belongs to. The model is as follows
where r i is the return of stock i, r ind i is the industry portfolio that stock i belongs to, and r m is the market index. We use the ICB industry classification with 41
industries.
In our cross-section regressions, we also include the lagged spread because the level of asymmetric information could correlate with the spread. To control for endogeneity and possible "look-ahead" bias, our independent variables are lagged by one year. Our empirical model is as follows:
where SK i,t is the skewness of the bid-ask spread of stock i at year t, V ola is the daily volatility during the year, Size is market capitalisation at year end, IE2 is the information asymmetry measure defined as before, ER is the measure of extreme market downturns defined as before, Asynch is the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) asynchronicity measure, and SP READ is the proportional spread. The cross-sectional regression results for Equation (2) are reported in Table   7 . This evidence is consistent with the liquidity spiral hypothesis (Brummermeier and Pedersen, 2009 ). We also show that the coefficient on size is large and significantly positive in 2008, implying that big firms are likely to have right-skewed bid-spreads during the financial crisis. This evidence contrasts to our expectation that small firms should have positive skewness. However, it could be argued that because trading with large firms require market markers to have sufficient capital and if market makers have funding constraints, the bid-ask spreads of large firms are more likely to be affected than those of small firms. Overall, our evidence shows that in times of crisis information asymmetry and the funding constraints of market makers can explain the skewness of bid-ask spreads. Table 7 : The cross-sectional regressions for skewness.
The summary statistics for the regression of the cross-sectional determinants of skewness.
where the dependent variable, SK i,t , denotes the averaged skewness for the proportional quoted spreads of stock i in year t. V ola is the daily return volatility for the year. Size is the market capitalisation at the previous year end. IE2 is the percentage difference in spreads five days after and five days before the earnings announcement date. ER is the percentage difference of spread between the extreme low returns and other days. Asynch is the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) 
Conclusion
Liquidity in financial markets is a key issue for investors, regulators and policy makers. Liquidity risk has an important role in determining transaction costs, enhancing asset management and promoting financial stability. Measuring liquidity by bid-ask spreads, this paper investigates the distribution and dynamics of liquidity in the LSE from 1996 to 2009. We find that bid-ask spreads have sharply declined in our sample period. This evidence suggests that market liquidity on the LSE has significantly improved. We also find that the reduction in bid-ask spreads is large Additionally, we find that bid-ask spreads are significantly higher prior to earnings announcements than post earnings announcements and we suggest that this is a consequence of asymmetric information differences. We also find that information asymmetry is more pronounced during the global financial crisis, implying that market illiquidity further increases the level of asymmetric information. These results are consistent with the view that competition reduces market makers abilities to influence the bid-ask spread. Our results show that extreme down markets are likely to increase bid-ask spreads and their skewness. Finally, our cross-section analysis examines whether firm-specific characteristics can explain the skewness of bid-ask spreads. We find that the effect of earnings announcements has a significant relationship with the skewness of bid-ask spreads during the crisis period, implying that asymmetric information is amplified by extreme market downturns
